Building a Living Democracy
Beyond Socialism and Capitalism
by Gar Alperovitz
Sojourner, April 1990

Page 8 of 9
Scale

It is important to understand that a major aim of the elements of a new system so far discussed is the development of a structural basis for an alternative, more egalitarian culture. In removing major wealth from private control (and allocating the proceeds democratically), in establishing demcratic control of local economic institutions, in moving toward increasing amounts of free time, in attempting to build a more stable community (and potentially a healthier social environment for individual development), in building an evolving structure of cooperative institutions--the goal is to anchor questions of equality in a new culture which is based upon an evolving set of new institutional relationships.

A structural underpinning of this kind could also help establish the preconditions of a less materialist culture, and it could facilitate a planning system to implement ecologically sound decisions. Such a culture is ultimately the only serious basis upon which more narrowly political measures to achieve greater equality (taxes and social programs) and greater ecological health (resource conservation and pollution controls) can hope to rest in the long run.

A final element in a solution both to the systemic problem and to the institutional-cultural problem has been little discussed by either theoreticians or citizens. This is the issue of scale. It is a matter of common sense that ideas of a living democracy and of serious participation require smaller scale units of governance.

The United States now spans a continent. It includes 250 million people.

(By way of comparison, the state of Oregon is bigger than West Germany.) Does anyone really believe that "participatory democracy" can be meaningful in a nation which includes such huge sweeps of geography and such large numbers of people?

Very large scale entities, furthermore, give enormous advantages to those who have money. In towns and cities, and even in small states, people know each other. It is also much easier to learn directly, and with some confidence, the reputation of people who are not known personally.

Furthermore, organizing efforts by grassroots groups--which depend heavily upon individual contacts and person-to-person relationships--are much easier in smaller scale units. In large geographic systems involving large numbers of people, what counts is the media--which means, as the saying goes, that "money talks." Indeed, the disproportionate advantages the rich enjoy in a highly unequal society are multiplied, as it were, when large numbers and large areas are involved.

There is a further consideration--one which James Madison, the "architect" of the American Constitution understood very well. Long before Karl Marx, Madison argued that the "principle political division" in society was between those who owned the means of production and those who did not: "...the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society...."

As a representative of the forme group, Madison worried that the majority would overwhelm the people he believed should guide the new republic. His "checks-and-balances" system was one method of slowing down the majority, but far more important (though less discussed) was his argument that large geographic scale gave the wealthy elites special advantages.

First, Madison argued that a government aiming to ensure private rights "must operate not within a small but an extensive sphere." The goal is not to accept the decision of the democratic majority. Rather, Madison asked:

"What remedy can be found in a republicand Government, where the majority must ultimately decide, but that giving such an extent to its sphere, that no common interest or passion will be likely to unite a majority of the whole number in an unjust pursuit? In a large society, the people are broken into so many interests and parties, that a common sentiment is less likely to be felt, and the requisite concert less likely to be formed, by a majority of the whole."

Madison recognized that he was playing with fire with this idea. Writing at a time when the nation extended little beyond the Appalachians, he saw even then that large scale--and the power it gave elites to divide the people into contending interests--could be dangerous. Writing to his friend Thomas Jefferson, he admitted that he was indeed arguing that "Divide et impera, the reprobated axiom of tyranny, is, under certain qualifications, the only policy by which a republic can be administered on just principles."

And at the very outset of the nation--in a society that was little more than a strip of colonies on the very edge of the ocean--he recognized that if the nation grew too large, "in too extensive a [society] a defensive concert may be rendered too difficult against the oppression of those entrusted with the administration."

We do not like to confront this argument head on. It implies that if we wish to take the idea of a living democracy seriously in the new century we must come to terms with the need for smaller scale units. The late William Appleman Williams, a very thoughtful radical historian, argued that a large nation like the United States would be wise to consider the possibility of long-term restructuring in terms of its regional units of, say, 10 or 12 "groupments" of states. The "United States" would then comprise a confederation of these units. There would be much greater decentralization of authority, and at the same time the regional units would work together in matters of defense, foreign policy, and ecological balance.

One way to think about an evolutionary process that could move toward decentralization is to consider the possible longer term trajectory of large states such as California and Texas. Given national political stalemates over many important problems, such states may well be forced to develop ever greater political-economic autonomy. Many are already experimenting with a wide range of special development policies. In turn, groupings of smaller states could well be required to join together in collaborative efforts--partly to undertake joint projects, partly as a defensive strategy.

But leaving aside possible evolutionary strategies, the fundamental question that must be confronted if we are serious about developing a meaningful new vision is whether our nation's huge scale inevitably contradicts the values we want to affirm. If so, we have no choice but to consider an ultimate American perestroika involving smaller units.

Meaningful planning would also logically take place--and management and stewardship of a substantial share of the "community inheritance" would occur--at the regional, subnational level.

Ethnic and so-called nationality questions often overlap and confuse the fundamental issue of scale, but while both scale and ethnicity are important, they are different. Within the huge empire of the Soviet Union, for instance, it is by no means obvious that centralized decision making could ever be made to work even if no ethnic or national divisions existed.

Smaller scale, or regional, decentralized authority makes sense for its own reasons. Similarly, in Canada, the Quebec separatist argument entails both an argument for smaller scale and a cultural challenge.

In Europe at present there is a rush toward greater economic and political integration aimed at 1992. However, in any serious historic perspective it is also obvious that there are strong possibilities for a "backlash" reaction once the difficulties of economic adjustment in a very large continental system are fully experienced, and people are forced to come to terms with their loss of decentralized authority. When such a backlash occurs, its main locus will likely be national, or in a few cases, such as France and Spain, perhaps regional within nations. Implicit here, too, is the fundamental problem of scale--and the importance of smaller, semiautonomous units of governance in any serious conception of participatory or living democracy.