Buy the Nukes: Deterrence Is Dead, But We Can Kill the Nuclear Threat
by Gar Alperovitz, Kai Bird, Thad Williamson
The Nation (January 22, 1996) Vol. 262, No. 3: 11-14.
Copyright 1996 The Nation Company Inc.

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During the cold war, proponents of nuclear weapons could cite the deterrent value of such arms to argue in favor of maintaining a nuclear arsenal. In today's era--characterized by growing technical and political imponderables--the notion that we can continue to rely on nuclear deterrence for real security seems ridiculously naive. Indeed, the deterrence theory collapses entirely in the event of a terrorist act. How and where could we retaliate? Moreover, nuclear weapons now play a role unfavorable to the United States even within Washington's own narrow terms of reference. In June 1992 the late Les Aspin, then chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, observed: "A world without nuclear weapons would not be disadvantageous to the United States. In fact, a world without nuclear weapons would actually be better. Nuclear weapons are still the big equalizer, but now the United States is not the equalizer but the equalizee."

In cold, hard, realistic terms, nuclear weapons are the bulwark of our Maginot line. Not only are such weapons increasingly useless; in maintaining them the United States encourages other nations to build and hold them "for their own protection" as well--thereby increasing the very threat U.S. policy seeks to contain. Even so ardent a cold warrior as Paul Nitze agrees that we "might reasonably contemplate making nuclear weapons largely obsolete for the most practical and fundamental strategic missions."

The obsolescence of nuclear weapons, as a usable means of warfare or as a deterrent, is slowly being recognized within the national security establishment; but largely unaddressed is the question of what to do. If we want real security--rather than the mere trappings of it--it is time for a radical refocusing of resources, for putting our money where the true problem lies. There is an obvious solution: The United States should buy up nuclear weapons throughout the globe and then dismantle them. Along with reducing the US. nuclear arsenal, this should be the top priority of U.S. national security policy.

Washington has, in fact, been nibbling away at buying nuclear security: In 1993 it gave $59 million to Belarus to dismantle its small arsenal; in 1994 it paid Kazakhstan an undisclosed amount estimated at $20-30 million in compensation for the removal of some 600 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium; and also in 1994 it offered Ukraine some $900 million in economic assistance after it renounced nuclear weapons. The United States has appropriated a total of $1.6 billion over the past five years to help the former Soviet republics disarm and safeguard nuclear materials. There is also a $12 billion, twenty-year agreement under way to buy 500 tons of weapons-grade uranium from Russia.

The Clinton Administration has used the promise of improved economic ties to rein in North Korea's nuclear weapons effort as well. In October 1994 the United States agreed to help Pyongyang build two "safe" nuclear energy reactors in return for a freeze of its weapons program. A State Department official described the overall approach as "Walk softly and carry a big carrot." The problem is, the carrots offered have been disproportionately tiny in comparison with the urgency of the issue--and puny in relation to most items in the Pentagon's weapons budget. Fifteen months after the agreement with North Korea, implementation of the plan remains slow and international inspectors have not had complete access to all nuclear facilities. Although there has been recent forward motion, the parties are still struggling over details of the aid program. Also, Congressional Republicans have threatened to slash by 40 percent the $23 million the United States is supposed to contribute to the incentive package. The purchase of Russian uranium has dragged because the United States Enrichment Corporation, a semi-private entity created by Congress to buy up highly enriched uranium, has encountered difficulties with private uranium interests, which fear world prices will ultimately suffer under the program.

(Even if the plan is successful, Russia will still have a stockpile estimated at 700 tons of weapons-grade uranium.) Ukraine's leaders recently warned that without further assistance they may have to suspend their nuclear-weapons dismantling program.

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